LIBERAL FASCISM 2
I continue this mini-series on Jonah Goldberg’s 2007
book Liberal Fascism.* (In these
Posts, Jonah Goldberg will be shortened to ‘JG’.)
JG notes that “the Nazis rose to power exploiting
anti-capitalist rhetoric they indisputably believed” and – whatever one may
think of Hitler himself – “it is impossible to deny the sincerity of the Nazi
rank and file”. (p.59) One only has to think of the (youthful) SA Brownshirts
who, in the early years (1925-1934) had joined indeed to effect a revolution on
behalf of the little people. In their conception of ‘national socialism’ –
following the grammar of their own Party’s title – ‘socialism’ was the key,
with a ‘national’ twist.
That ‘national’ twist – JG will write elsewhere** - stemmed
from the fact that Mussolini and Hitler both realized that Marx had made a
profound error in imagining that the ‘workers of the world’ would be more
tightly emotionally connected to each other than to their native countries. In
that sense World War 1 had been a glaring refutation of Marx: the workers and
the masses had flocked to their own national colors, enthusiastically at first
and then later with a grim determination or resignation. Their common-identity
as the oppressed masses – presumed by Marx in his classification schematic –
had proven ephemeral.
When Hitler realized he had to slap-down the
increasingly restive SA Brownshirts in June of 1934 it was in great part
because they now expected him, as legitimate Chancellor of Germany, to
institute the socialist revolution’s agenda forthwith.
(Yes, Hitler had other reasons for de-clawing the
SA: the Army was very unhappy that the Party’s ‘private army’ greatly
outnumbered the official armed forces; the SA leader, Hitler’s old
Party-comrade Ernst Rohm, was also becoming increasingly frustrated with
Hitler’s delay in instituting the socialist agenda for which the SA yearned; and
Hitler had a second agenda: to wage
war to restore and secure Germany’s place in Europe and in the world – for
which a fully functioning national industrial and military structure was
essential and he wasn’t going to make the mistake the Soviets made in 1918 of
so eviscerating the established industrial and military capacity of Russia that
it was incapable of keeping up its role in the war and remained for over a
decade wrapped up in its own internal convulsions.)
Hefty doses of socialism, Hitler realized, tended to
greatly weaken any nation that imposed them on itself. I think he somehow –
however inchoately – grasped that the glowing end-product of a successful
socialist revolution blinded governments and people to the hugely dangerous
period when the nation would be ‘transforming’ itself. No matter how bright the
(conceptual) end-point, historically socialism would create lethal and probably
fatal damage to the nation in the period of ‘transition’ – assuming that such
an end-point could ever be fully or even substantially reached in the first
place.
But – JG notes – the Nazi programme included many
themes “of later New Lefts in other places and times: the primacy of race, the
rejection of rationalism, an emphasis on the organic and the holistic … and,
most of all, the need to ‘transcend’ notions of class”. (p.59)
Without descending into a conceptually primitive
reduction of American New Left programmes to Nazisim pure and simple, one still
has to face the fact of the existence of those themes in modern American
politics.
“Race” – somehow – is still a major theme here (not
only similar to the Nazi programme, but even after half-a-century of intense
government action on the subject of ‘race’ it remains a difficult and torturous matter).
And, of course, the dynamic has only been
astronomically intensified by Identity Politics’ expansion with the addition of
Ethnicity (let alone citizenship status in the first place) and – first and
foremost – Gender.
Even if you were to propose that the ‘Identity’ of
America is now to have no Identity – in the sense of a single unifying and
commonly-accepted national sense of commonality among the Citizenry – yet the
dynamic remains essentially the same.
The rejection of ‘rationalism’ – which I would
prefer to phrase as the rejection of Reason – and its concomitant embrace of
Emotion as the primary means of processing information and conducting critical
inquiry is well-established here. In my series of Posts on influential
radical-feminist legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon’s 1989 summa Toward A Feminist Theory of the State it
is made clear and overtly asserted that in the radical-feminist schema,
‘reason’ is male and intuition or emotion is female and – but of course – that
the country needs to get rid of the primacy of reason (and rationality) if it
is going to get rid of ‘patriarchy’. (Nor has her advice been ignored by the
Beltway and the assorted highly-organized Identity-advocacies to which it is
now indentured.)
And in my Post on sociological philosopher Theodore
Lowi I noted his acute observation that Liberalism – especially in its recent
variant or mutation here – precisely is averse to rationality and the rules and
principles that flow from it because such rules and principles create
obstructive boundaries that hamper the plasticity and fluidity, the vagueness
and fuzziness, which ‘liberal’ politicians desperately require in order to have
maximum flexibility in meeting whatever demands and agendas are pushed their
way by their client (yet now controlling) advocacies’ interests.
And it is built into revolutionary theory 101 that
since the old order’s ‘rationality’ and the entire structure of societal and
cultural order and Shape built upon it are presumptively corrupt and tainted,
then nothing of the ‘old’ order is to be considered useful and binding upon the
cadres and vanguards of the revolution(s) in their gimlet-eyed march through
the institutions and their quest for (their version of) the ideal polity and
people. (So much for the Framing Vision and the Constitution and the rule of
law as well as of reason.)
The “emphasis on the organic and the holistic”
refers to mushy but powerful currents flowing toward some quasi-mystical sense
of an underlying unity and order to existence that nobody (except the
vanguards) can yet see, but will – they assure their hapless masses – prove to
be the magic Key to a comprehensively meaningful and ‘naturally’ ordered world
in which everybody can do what they want yet it will all work out happily because
people (except the designated ‘oppressors’) are ‘naturally’ good and that
goodness only requires the sweeping-away of the ‘old’ in order to reassert
itself in all its pristine glory. It will all come together like a marvelous
brunch omlette … once the necessary eggs are broken. Yah.
And – but of course – any formally religious Source
for that order and underlying unity is to be dismissed as mere ‘opium’,
collusively imposed on the masses by organized religions that are merely the
spiritual arm of the oppression that distracts or crushes the hopes and dreams
and rights of the masses. Embrace the revolution as your religion and do it
with your whole heart and mind and soul (if, indeed, humans have a soul –
revolutionary dogma is unsettled or ‘richly diverse’ on that point).
And the divisions of ‘class’ are to be done away
with. Although after half a century of America’s many-revolutions-at-once We
appear to have been stratified economically into classes with a glaring
inequity that was not seen even in the first Gilded Age. And We appear to have
been stratified and fractalized by divisions based on Gender and Ethnicity and
victimization in half a thousand forms.
And in consequence, Shape, Grounds, Boundaries,
Essence, Nature (especially human nature), and Reason itself have all been
kicked to the curb under the claim of ‘liberating from oppression’. In some
ways it’s an adolescent’s dampdream. But is it any way to conduct and sustain a
society and a nation and a culture and a civilization?
Hitler was a revolutionary and saw himself as such.
But of course if Hitler was a ‘revolutionary’ then that tars all
‘revolutionaries’ with not only the dynamic of the Holocaust (mass murder of
the nationally-designated Other) but also with the glaring examples of
revolution’s irrationality, brutality, and failure as a medium for achieving
lasting social good without creating even more social evil in the process. So
Hitler’s deeply-rooted revolutionary aspects were conveniently ignored, and he
was cast historically as some ‘Establishment’ whack-job gone postal and gone
viral. Neat.
Reflecting on the fact that Woodrow Wilson – as
determined and committed a Progressive as Teddy Roosevelt – imprisoned more
people (and Americans) than Mussolini in the entire decade of the 1920s***, JG
observes that Wilson had a philosophical or at least ideological system to
provide benefit-of-rationality and justification for his action: Progressivism.
Although they reserved the term for their enemies,
“the progressives were the real social Darwinists as we think of the term
today”. (p.81)
“They believed in eugenics. They were imperialists.
They were convinced that the state could, through planning and pressure, create
a pure race, a society of new men. They were openly and proudly hostile to
individualism. Religion was a political tool, while politics was the true
religion. [They] viewed the traditional system of constitutional checks and
balances as an outdated impediment to progress because such horse-and-buggy
institutions were a barrier to their own ambitions. Dogmatic attachment to
constitutions, democratic practices, and antiquated laws was the enemy of
progress for fascists and progressives alike. Indeed fascists and progressives
shared the same intellectual heroes and quoted the same philosophers.” (p.81)
The belief in eugenics nowadays has mutated from
first-wave Progressivism: whereas the first-wave – reflecting a
scientific-industrial urge to classify and yet also some sense that somehow
some human beings seemed to be better capable of going about the living of life
than others – looked to the biology of eugenics and the classification (more
than any nascent manipulation) of humans according to their biological
capabilities, current emphasis is on the grossly general (and cartoonish) division
of Gender: females are better and males are not.
The government’s confidence in its ability to plan –
however misplaced – is even more engorged than it was in the days of the
first-wave, actualizing what were for Wilson’s era only inchoate hopes and
expectations.
The corrosion of the status of any traditional
religious realities (let alone Reality) is well-established and on-going, despite
whatever lip-service is still publicly and formally paid by the government.
And government continually works to make itself for
all practical purposes the repository and source for whatever meaning and hopes
and succor citizens can seek against the trials and tribulations of life.
But it is with glaring clarity (and alarm) that We
should realize how far advanced is the government’s abandonment of the
machinery and the first-principles of the Framing Vision and its Constitution. Again,
you could look at MacKinnon’s 1989 summa to see this formally and overtly
demanded as national and governmental policy, justified by this and that
(borrowed from Marx and Lenin and Antonio Gramsci and a host of their
contemporary fellow travelers) ‘philosophical’ justification that indeed the
“horse and buggy” democracy of 1787 ‘just doesn’t get it’. Nowadays it is the
‘radical democracy’ of the Eurocommunists of the 1960s and 1970s, which
declares in-your-face that it has no need for “deliberative democratic
politics”.
The first-principles of the Framing Vision are
claimed to be ‘obstructions’ indeed, and those obstructions need to be removed
if ‘progress’ is to be made.
Tellingly, JG notes that “Today, liberals remember
the progressives as do-gooders who cleaned up the food supply and agitated for a
more generous social welfare state and better working conditions … but so did
the Nazis and the Italian Fascists. And they did so for the same reasons and in
loyalty to roughly the same principles.” (p.81)
And the key thrust of his insight here is that We
need to understand just what is driving the American government and American
governance and politics nowadays, because those driving elements are the same
ones that created such ill-consequences (intended or unintended) when deployed
in the past. While nobody can predict the future, We at least have to realize
that the ‘progressive’ package We have purchased (or rather that the Beltway
has purchased with Our tax monies and has imposed on Us) has some verrrry dark
spots in its past-performance record. Indeed, it was – I would say – these dark
spots, allowed to fester and propagate immune from the cleansing light of
public scrutiny, that enabled Dick Cheney to so overtly and not ashamedly opine
that this country must take a walk “on the dark side”: the Beltway had by that
time a decade or so ago been doing it for quite a while. Darkness corrupts and
spreads and migrates and mutates and intensifies, if it is allowed to avoid the
light.
American Progressivism has always played with
dangerous dynamics. And there’s something of risk and danger in all things that
governments undertake to do. But that the American public has never really been
allowed to comprehend the full scope of that dangerousness has removed one of
the most profound – and perhaps last-ditch – defenses the Framing Vision and
the Constitution have to avoid being utterly undermined.
“If the age of parliamentary democracy was coming to
an end – as progressives and fascists alike proclaimed – and the day of the
organic redeemer state was dawning, then the Constitution must evolve or be
thrown into the dustbin of history.” (p.88)
Woodrow Wilson railed against “artificial” obstructions and “antiquated”
18th-century systems of checks and balances that had to be
“smashed”. He openly made fun of “Fourth of July sentiments” about the Framers
as any guides to American governance. He sought an “evolving” Constitution that
– JG rightly realizes – is not much different from the ‘living Constitution’ approaches
of today’s legal eagles. (But Wilson also didn’t see the use of asking The
People to ‘evolve’ the Constitution; the government, informed by its benevolent
and omniscient elites, could best handle that job on its own.) (all quotes, p.
88)
As Darwin’s species had to evolve or die off, so too
must American governance. (As if cultures and civilizations followed the same
rules as biological evolution, and as if the government could take the place of
Nature or whatever force and principle drove biological evolution.)
Further, a “great man” was needed to lead and run
the whole thing. (And if there was one thing that both Teddy Roosevelt and
Woodrow Wilson (as JG puts it: “two very different men with very similar
ideas”) thought they were, it was that each thought he was a Great Man.) This
Great Man would serve “both as the natural expression of the people’s will and
as a guide and master checking their darker impulses”. (p.89)
And – Wilson’s imagery here – “the leader needed to
be like a brain, which both regulates the body and relies upon it for
protection”. So the Great Man would be the Leader who would be like the
nation’s brain; and he would be protected by the masses who would be the
cannon-fodder. How much further from the first-principles of the Framing Vision
can you get, really? The entire American Great Experiment of 1787 was based
upon the faith in the ability of The People to govern themselves and their
government.
How much closer to Wilson’s alarming (and profoundly
anti-American) vision are We today – where increasing numbers of Americans (or
‘resident persons’) are simply client-demographics, dependent on the government
for sustenance and self-image, and expected to do nothing more for themselves
or the common-weal than show up to vote for their patron-Party on election
days?
“The masses”, as JG quotes Wilson from an 1890 essay
(long before he became a presidential candidate), are to be used by the “true
leader” as “tools”. And he must “speak to stir their passions, not their
intellects”. (p.89) How much closer are We to that today, in Our politics and
in Our political competence as The People? How much closer do We want to allow
Ourselves to get?
Worse, as JG puts it, Wilson did not see himself as
a cynic, but instead “Wilson believed he was an idealist”. (p.89) Which means
that on top of the dangerousness of
the political concepts he espoused, he also
believed he was doing the totally right thing for a good purpose and in a good
cause (and thus that helped justify his self-conception that he was indeed a
Great Man).
Thus there were several aspects to the gritty gem of
Progressivism: there was an academic and social reforming face, exemplified in
such as John Dewey and Jane Addams; there was a nationalistic and militaristic face
that emphasized patriotism and militarism. Thus – eerily – one side emphasized
‘nationalism’ and one side emphasized ‘socialism’ (which, you may already have
guessed, Hitler shrewdly combined 20 or so years later in ‘national
socialism’). But in either case, JG realizes, all Progressives did believe in a
national “greatness” (p.90) And – but of course – with Greatness goes Great Responsibility
… and the Authority to Actualize and Enforce it.
Thus, you may at this point intone with the
announcer at Santa Anita back in the day: Aaaand they’re offfff!
JG traces the beginnings of American Progressivism
to the post-Civil War era, when American intellectuals and academics were drawn
to Europe for fresh sophistication not available at home.
There they encountered Nietzsche’s thought: fiery
and impatient and grand, violently rejecting mediocrity (no matter how sane)
for the dynamic power of the human will (no matter how deranged). Normality was
not the path Nietzsche would take – it led only to a weak mind and heart,
dependent on the companionship and approval of other human mediocrities for its
consolation; the non-Normal (not to say the abnormal) would be his métier,
would be the stamping and breeding grounds for his Over-man (Ubermensch, also translated as Super-man
or Above-man): the type of human being who would face the challenges of life on
his own, rejecting the soft seductions of bourgeois personal and social life
and order. You think of Melville’s Ahab. The early Progressives would have been
drawn to Ahab after they came back from their European tours.
William James was particularly taken with the
mid-century Italian pragmatists, vigorously trying to think-through the new
Italy which Cavour had united in 1860 for the first time since the days of
Rome. The Italian pragmatists caught the attention of the young Mussolini, who
then also read the American pragmatist William James, and often spoke of the
intellectual debt he owed to the American. (p.94)
But it was – JG notes – Germany that was the focal
point of the newly-minted American intellectual elites, now organized and
self-classified (like so much else after the massive Union organizing efforts
and achievements of the Civil War) into a class unto themselves.
And in Germany, where the professorial elites were
well-established and the revolutionary bug had long stimulated much thinking
and imagining, those elites looked upon the peasant and urban masses as being
in dire need of “experts who could mold society like clay”. (p.95) After all,
if generals could organize larger and hugely equipped armies, and admirals
fleets, and industrialist the massively productive corporate matrix of
factories, then couldn’t the knowledge-elites do the same for society and
culture generally? And even the lumps of people themselves?
People, thus, needed to be updated for the bright
new future and the approaching new century. And not their souls – if they had
such a thing – but their minds and their hearts and their habits. And the
knowledgeable elites were just the ones to advise the state on how to do it.
And keep on doing it.
Bismarck’s Prussia was of especial interest, with
its new-fangled government-provided welfare-net programs devised by Bismarck
himself. “Top-down socialism” was his idea: if the masses of citizens want
protection from the capitalist system so that there is some sort of safety-net
for them and their families when things go wrong, and if they might start yet
another revolution to get it, then it’s more efficient and useful for the
government to give it to them and keep the country humming along smoothly. What
do the socialist reformers and revolutionaries demand? Then the government will
of its own accord quickly provide it. (Which, of course, pulled the rug out of
the aforesaid socialist reformers and revolutionaries.)
Health insurance, the eight-hour workday, social
insurance and a host of other benefits were introduced on Bismarck’s
uncontestable authority. As early as 1862. And once the Iron Chancellor made up
his mind, then Prussia and then a politically united Germany would go where he
led. He was obviously a Great Man, and the American Progressives were in awe of
him. Might they not have such a wonderful human machine of their own, back in
the United States? Might they not work for one and offer their services and
their (slightly-more constestable) wisdoms?
Heady stuff, this.
Whether a constitutional republic could platform the
career and ministrations of a powerful and forceful Great Man whose
achievements were won as Chancellor of a state-full of Prussians, and then as
Iron Chancellor of a newly-minted empire of newly-united German states …
whether the American political system and the Framing Vision and the profoundly
original American political guiding ‘genius’ could serve as a platform for a
European (and Prussian) Great Man form of Executive – and the concomitant
subservience of the Congress (as the Reichstag
was subservient to Bismarck) - is a Question that Progressive thought didn’t even
bother to deeply consider.
It makes you wonder: was this what the Beltway was trying forty-plus years ago? Was it
trying to run the Bismarckian ‘top-down’ play here? But that would presume that the country was faced with a genuine threat
of armed revolution (as Bismarck was always fearful, after 1848; especially in
the loose agglomeration of German statelets and states) that created, as it
were, an ‘emergency’ or ‘crisis’ of first-order proportions: a potentially
successful armed revolution against the government.
Was that the case in the United States forty-odd
years ago? And while there were certainly American troops deployed domestically
for riots, was there ever really a sense that the country was facing another
Civil War over civil rights for blacks?
And it surely wasn’t the case with any of the
follow-on Identity groups such as radical-feminism and the gays.
If anything, the ‘crisis’ of forty-plus years ago
was demographic and electoral; the ‘emergency’ was simply one of the Beltway
seeking to create new client voting-groups.
And yet in the service of that objective, and while
ominous first-order challenges relating to the sustainability of the American
economy were waiting to be addressed, the Beltway introduced – and hardly for
the most urgent and serious of reasons – a version of ‘top-down’ Bismarckian
governance that could at that point in history take advantage of the coercive
and control capabilities of the most powerful government on the planet.
And – in the event and hardly unsurprisingly – the consequences
of introducing so profoundly incompatible a mode of governance into the
American system, cloaked deceptively in the garb of ‘good old’ American
Progressivism and ‘liberation’ and increasingly fortified through the Beltway
acceptance of contemporary as well as historical European socialist (and
communist) thinking, are now too clear to be denied: the engorgement of the
Executive until – like a rogue sun – it bends the trajectories of all other
political Branches and bodies around it; the distraction of the national
energies into unconsidered political and cultural changes that from the get-go
were antithetical to the American political system; and the necessary weakening
of The People through the distraction and corruption of whatever political
discourse was allowed to take place.
Until at this point it remains a first-order
Question: what can be recovered and restored?
NOTES
*Goldberg, Jonah. Liberal Fascism. Doubleday: New York, 2007. ISBN: 978-0-385-51184-1
(hard cover). It’s also out in paperback.
**In his 2012 book The Tyranny of Cliches. Sentinel: New York, 2012. ISBN: 978-1-59523-086-7.
***And of course today the U.S. imprisons more
people than any other country on the planet, and more than Stalin stuffed into
the Gulag.
Labels: American political development since the Sixties, American political history, Progressivism, socialism
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